

Cultural Diversity, Biodiversity Conservation, and Modern Identity:

Conflicts about biocultural diversity in Thung Yai,

a World Heritage Site in Thailand

Reiner Buergin, 2011

Institute of Forestry Economics, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität Freiburg, Germany

Abstract:

Interrelations between biological and cultural diversity have become important controversial issues in discourses about nature conservation, sustainable development, and indigenous rights. This paper reviews very broadly the conceptualization of these interrelations in different discourses and points to 'conflicts about biocultural diversity' as a common empirical core issue of these discourses. It is argued that these conflicts represent a historically specific expression of conflicts at the fringes of expanding modern societies, framed in current discourses which increasingly propose, at the same time, the preservation of biological as well as cultural diversity, going along with an 'ecologization' of the natural and social periphery of modernity.

As an example for such conflicts, the case of Karen ethnic minority groups in the Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary and World Heritage Site in Thailand is analyzed. The paper identifies major re-framings of the conflict over the last century focusing on interdependent changes on the local, national, and international level related to modernization processes.

Referring to ongoing controversies about 'modernity' and 'cultural diversity', the paper finally advocates, in an inductive approach, a particularistic conceptualization of modernity and an alterity-oriented concept of cultural diversity in the context of a self-reflexive 'culture of modernity'.

Keywords: Thung Yai, World Heritage Site, Karen, Thailand, Cultural Diversity, Biocultural Diversity, Modernity

1. Global discourses about interrelations between cultural and biological diversity

Biological diversity as well as cultural diversity have become prominent concepts in the discourses on nature conservation, development, indigenous rights, and globalization. Biodiversity conservation is widely conceived of as a prerequisite for ecologically sound relations between humans and their natural environments, while cultural diversity is increasingly recognized as an important factor regarding the coexistence of human communities as well as their sustainable development. Since the late 1980s, furthermore, interrelations between biological and cultural diversity have come into the focus of academic, political, and economic interests and discourses. However, these discourses about 'biocultural diversity'¹ are highly controversial, specifically regarding conceptualizations of 'cultural diversity' which are often divergent in different academic fields, if defined at all. To compound matters, the conceptualization of cultural difference and diversity, to a high degree, involves contested issues of modern identity and self-conceptualization.

The conceptualization of interrelations between cultural and biological diversity mainly occurred in three interdependent and overlapping discourses and problem areas: in the arguments and conflicts about rights of indigenous people on local resources and self-determination; in the debates on modernization and sustainable development of non-modern populations in developing countries; and in the context of the conceptualization and implementation of global strategies for nature conservation.

Problems of 'cultural diversity' on a global scale were already at stake in the disputes about 'occidental' roots and biases of 'universal human rights' (e.g. AAA 1947), predominantly framed in terms of universalistic versus relativistic positions. They became crucial in the arguments about 'indigenous people' and their particular rights to local resources and self-determination (e.g. Heinz 1991; Niezen 2003; Peterson 2010). In the context of the United Nations Environmental Conference in Stockholm 1972, for the first time, these groups established organizations to support their claims on the international level, frequently referring to a special relation to their natural environment and the land they live on. The 'Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples'

¹ The term 'biocultural diversity' is increasingly used to refer to interrelations between biological and cultural diversity (e.g. Maffi 2001; Cocks 2006). In this usage it is not related to the term 'biocultural' used since the 1960s, predominantly in medical and psychological anthropology, to refer to relations between physical and cultural traits of human groups.

was adopted in 2007 by the UN General Assembly, "recognizing that respect for indigenous knowledge, cultures and traditional practices contributes to sustainable and equitable development and proper management of the environment" (UN 2007; Oldham and Frank 2008). Nevertheless, the concept of 'indigenous peoples' remains contested and the status of these groups in most countries precarious (e.g. Kingsbury 1998; Jentoft, Minde, and Nilsen 2003). Disputes focus on the compatibility of universal human rights with particular entitlements of indigenous and cultural minorities, on the justification and achievement of their claims on local resources, self-determination, and autonomy, as well as on conceptions of particularly sustainable environmental relations of indigenous groups (e.g. Deveaux 2000; Brown 2003; Minde et al. 2008).

Besides these debates on indigenous rights, 'cultural diversity' and its relations to 'biological diversity' also became an issue in the discourses on modernization and sustainable development. Since the 1970s, disappointing results of modernization strategies in developing countries increasingly were related to the neglect of cultural differences on the national and local level (e.g. Brokensha, Warren, and Werner 1980; Cernea 1985). As 'traditional', pre-modern forms of social organization and knowledge, these differences first were primarily analyzed and utilized for modernization purposes. It was not before the 1980s, that intrinsic values of this diversity and opportunities it provides regarding sustainable or alternative ways of development received broader attention (e.g. Williams and Baines 1988; Berkes 1989), frequently related to approaches of community based natural resource management (e.g. Ostrom 1990; Bromley 1992). In this context, controversies focus on the significance of cultural differences for different ways into modernity or alternative developments, on the epistemological status of local knowledge systems, as well as on their relevance for strategies of sustainable development (e.g. World Bank 2001; Briggs and Sharp 2004).

Apart from the discourses on indigenous people and sustainable development, 'cultural diversity' likewise came into the focus of global debates on nature conservation. Since the 1980s, numerous projects in developing countries aiming at the mobilization of local people for nature conservation (e.g. Western and Wright 1994; Borgerhoff Mulder and Coppolillo 2005), as well as a change from 'fortress conservation' to 'co-management strategies' in international conservation discourses (e.g. Wells and Brandon 1992; IUCN and McNeely 1993), went along with the up-swing of conceptualizations of indigenous or local people and their particular knowledge as eco-

logically beneficial (e.g. McNeely and Pitt 1985; Oldfield and Alcorn 1991). However, these changes of focus and strategy, far from being adequately implemented on a broader scale (e.g. Jeanrenaud 2002; Brechin et al. 2003, Brockington and Igoe 2006), are still ardently disputed: specifically regarding conceptualizations of indigenous or local people as 'benign environmentalists' or 'ecologically noble savages', problematic transformations of their environmental relations in modernization processes, and their significance for biodiversity conservation (e.g. Buege 1996; Headland 1997; Vermeulen and Sheil 2007).

Conceptualizations of interrelations between biological and cultural diversity became important only in the late 1980s, not least due to two major events of the global political discourse on environment and development. While the Brundtland-Report (Brundtland 1987) and the concept of sustainable development - which reconciled the conflict between modernization and conservation discursively - merged the debates on conservation, development and social justice, the Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro 1992 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCED 1992) - which explicitly links biological and cultural diversity - resulted in far reaching institutionalizations of issues of environment and development. Against this background, 'indigenous', 'traditional' or 'local' people widely became conceived of as promising partners for biodiversity conservation (e.g. Stevens 1997; Stone and D'Andrea 2001). As so called 'biodiversity hotspots' with a high biological diversity frequently coincide with areas of extraordinary linguistic or cultural diversity (e.g. Oviedo, Maffi, and Larsen 2000; Loh and Harmon 2005), the protection of cultural diversity is even propagated as a strategy for global biodiversity conservation (e.g. Posey and UNEP 1999; IUCN and WCPA 2003; Maffi and Woodley 2010), while the decrease of linguistic and cultural diversity, going along with the loss of biodiversity, is deplored from the perspective of the social sciences and humanities (e.g. Krauss 1996; Harmon 2002; Whaley 2003). Economic interests focus on the bioprospection of genetic resources in habitats of indigenous people supported by their local knowledge (e.g. Shiva 1997; Stepp, Wyndham, and Zarger 2002; McManis 2007), as well as on the appeal of areas of high biological and cultural diversity for eco- and ethno-tourism (e.g. Ceballos-Luscaráin 1996; Hinch 2004, West and Carrier 2004). Furthermore, biodiversity conservation by means of local resource control, identity building, and self-determination is propagated as a localist counter-strategy to globalist strategies of global resource management and free-market economization (e.g. Peet and Watts 1996; Hines

2000).

A common core issue of these diverse discourses on interrelations between biological and cultural diversity refers to encounters between modern social groups and institutions with globally framed interests in the conservation, management, and use of natural resources on the one hand, and 'culturally' different groups claiming local resources and separate identities on the other hand. Empirically, this problematic finds its expression in a specific type of conflicts in which interrelations between natural, social, and cognitive resources as well as cultural difference, identity, and recognition have become contested core issues for both sides of the encounter, regarding current interests as well as development options.

This paper argues that such 'conflicts about biocultural diversity' represent a historically specific expression of conflicts at the fringes of expanding modern societies. While encounters between modern and non-modern groups have a long history in the course of the expansion of modernity, conflicts about biocultural diversity are specifically framed in current discourses which increasingly propose, at the same time, the preservation of biological as well as cultural diversity, going along with an 'ecologization' of the natural and social periphery of modernity. In this context, non-modern groups have to face new challenges and threats. However, these discourses also provide new chances for them to defend claims on local resources and different identities.

In conflicts about biocultural diversity, chances and options of non-modern local groups are considerably determined by the way modern groups conceive of themselves and 'cultural diversity'. Conceptualizations of the 'other' of modernity, its fringes and boundaries, have changed frequently in the history of modernity. In modernization theories, for instance, self-conceptions of modernity tended to be 'particularistic', involving 'exclusive' conceptions of cultural difference and diversity which conceived of non-modern social groups as 'outside', 'below', and 'before' modernity. Recent globalization discourses more often imply 'universalistic' imaginations of modernity and 'inclusive' conceptions of cultural diversity, be it as a problem, challenge, or constitutive element of modernity. This paper questions both, exclusive-particularistic as well as inclusive-universalistic conceptualizations. In an inductive approach, it calls for a particularistic but alterity-oriented self-conception of modernity. To preserve and support natural as well as cultural diversity in the context of a growing awareness for a global environmental crisis, this paper argues, concepts of cultural diversity are required which facilitate reflections on interrelations between a

particular 'culture of modernity' and diverse non-modern social entities.

To support these arguments, in the following chapters, conflicts about biocultural diversity in Thailand and their transformations are analyzed, focusing on the case of Karen communities in the Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary and World Heritage Site.² A first part reviews the national and international context of the conflict which is significantly determined by disputes about deforestation and nature conservation (2.1) as well as interdependencies between protected area policies and the status of so called 'hill tribe' ethnic minority groups in Thailand (2.2). The second part, after a short introduction into the history and self-image of the Karen in Thung Yai (3.1), concentrates on internal transformations of the 'traditional' communities in reaction to challenges from their modernizing social environments. These changes concern the socio-cultural organization of the communities (3.2); their political system and the tradition of their values and way of life (3.3); as well as their land use system and livelihoods (3.4); and resulted in different strategies of adaptation and resistance (3.5). A final part reflects the current situation of the Karen in Thung Yai against the background of national and international discourses on nature conservation and local rights (4.1), and reconsiders conflicts about biocultural diversity globally regarding modern identities and requirements for new conceptualizations of cultural diversity (4.2).

2.1 Modernization, conservationism, and community forests in Thailand

The British colonization of Burma/Myanmar in the early 19th century may be seen as a major event initializing the 'modernization' of Siam/Thailand. Even though Thailand never became a colonial state herself, interests and concepts of the western colonial powers in Mainland Southeast Asia were most important in this process. The demarcation of the frontier between British Burma and Siam was a first step in the territorialization of Siam and the establishment of its modern 'geo-body' (Thongchai 1994), while the imposition of the Bowring Treaties in the middle of the 19th century marked an important turning point regarding Thailand's economic modernization (Sompop 1989; Feeny 1982). Western concepts of territoriality, nationality, rationality, civility, and modernity were crucial in the process of the emergence of the Siamese nation state and

² The comprehensive data and references on which the analysis of the conflict is based are accessible in Buergin 2002 and 2004, with tables and graphs in English language.

bureaucracy towards the end of the 19th century (Thongchai 1994, 2000) as well as for its 'nationalization' and the formation of its 'people-body' in the 20th century (Connors 2003). From the 1950s to the 1980s, modernization processes in Thailand were predominantly related to economic development and infrastructure extension in the context of changing global markets and international political conflicts (e.g. Pasuk and Baker 1997). Since the 1980s, the 'ecologization' of the (natural and social) peripheral areas of the country, regarding problems of deforestation, nature conservation, land rights, resource conflicts, ethnic conflicts and national identity, has become a crucial issue in societal disputes about social justice, democratization and development of the Thai civil society and nation state (e.g. Buergin and Kessler 1999).

The forests of Thailand, as valuable natural resources, did play an important role in these processes of modernization and globalization from the beginning. Timber, and specifically Teak, was among the resources that were of major interest to the colonial powers and the regional elites (Renard 1987; Banasopit 1988). In the context of the territorialization of the emerging Siamese nation state, the Royal Forest Department (RFD) was established in 1896 to provide lucrative revenues from northern teak forests for the new central power in Bangkok and to secure its hegemony over the local nobility there. During the first half of the 20th century, the main concern of the RFD was to allocate and control concessions for Teak extraction, predominantly executed by British companies. Territorial control of the vast areas under the administration of the RFD - about 75% of the total land area - was neither of interest nor feasible. It was not before the late 1950s that the RFD increasingly tried to restrict local forest use and to improve territorial control through the demarcation of forest reserves (Vandergeest 1996a).

This shift was essentially related to the growing importance of the forests for the national development in the context of international economic modernization strategies. After World War II, the international 'forestry community' realized that Europe as well as the United States would be increasingly dependent on the timber resources of the tropical forests. The economic importance of the tropical forests for developing countries as well as detrimental effects of shifting cultivation for tropical forest resources were emphasized. Conceptions of tropical forests as important resources for the process of modernization were to guide the forest policies of the FAO and many developing countries during the 1960s and beyond (Steinlin and Pretzsch 1984). By the mid-1960s, almost 40% of Thailand's total land area was assigned as concession area and swidden

cultivation was prohibited.

The global spread of the modernization paradigm and the expanding world market also influenced national agricultural policies. During the 1960s and 1970s, the driving force of the rapid economic growth in Thailand was the state propagated diversification of cash cropping for the world market in combination with the extension of agricultural areas on behalf of forest areas (e.g. Hirsch 1987; Rigg 1993). In connection with a fast growing population as well as excessive logging and failed conservation policies of the RFD this modernization strategy resulted in rapid deforestation. Within thirty years, the forest cover decreased from almost two thirds to less than one third of the total land area in the early 1980s, and deforestation was increasingly perceived as a problem, culminating in a logging ban in 1989.

Now the RFD had to explain the rapid deforestation towards a conservation sensitive urban public with growing political power. It had also to deal with some 10 million rural people - about one fifth of the total population - who were living 'illegally' in areas declared forest reserves. Of these 'forest areas', more than one third was used for agricultural purposes, constituting at least one third of Thailand's whole agricultural area (Vandergeest 1996b; Pasuk and Baker 1997). In this uncomfortable situation of contested competence and growing resistance, the RFD, supported by international conservation strategies, concentrated on the implementation of a 'Protected Area System' (PAS).

As in many other countries, efforts to protect 'nature' or 'biodiversity' in Thailand focus on the conservation of natural monuments, forests, plants and animals in protected areas established and controlled by government authorities. Historically, modern ideas about nature conservation, apart from concerns about the protection of nature, frequently had their roots in hunting-interests, aesthetic-recreational desires of urban elites, and nation building, which are all relevant in Thailand too. Under a nationalist military rule after WW II, 'nature' came to be conceived of as an important element of national identity besides the Monarchy, Buddhism and the Thai-language. Following international conceptions of nature conservation, predominantly presupposing an inherent incompatibility between nature conservation and human resource use, the legal provisions for the demarcation of protected areas were created in the 1960s, and the RFD was charged with the task to establish and control these areas (Vandergeest 1996b). However, the demarcation of protected areas at first proceeded only slowly. It was not before the 1980s in the context of a new forest

policy of 'functional territorialization' (Vandergeest 1996a) that conservation areas increased considerably and plans to establish a Protected Area System became the main instrument of nature conservation in Thailand. This PAS is supposed to include all existing 'natural forests' as well as all protected areas and watershed areas with the objective to be enlarged up to 28 % of the total land area (RFD 1993). During the 1990s, the PAS became of major concern for the RFD as a way to secure sovereignty over large areas as well as positions of power within the state bureaucracy and the Thai society (Vandergeest 1996b; Buergin 2003a).

In the conflicts about forests and local livelihoods, a strong civil society movement emerged. The issue of people living in forest reserves and the community forest debate became an important societal controversy over social justice, resource control, land rights, democratization and decentralization (e.g. Buergin and Kessler 2000). The controversy mainly finds its expression in two opposing positions: On the one side, the RFD together with the military, conservation oriented academics, and 'dark green' NGOs concentrate on conservation issues. For them "people and forests cannot co-exist" and protection of forests requires the removal of human settlements out of forests. On the other side, groups of the peasant movement, socially concerned academics, and 'light green' NGOs focus on interests and problems of rural communities. They presuppose a vital interest of local communities in the protection of their forests as a source of livelihood as well as for their ecological and cultural functions and therefore support community forests (*pa tschum tschon*) as a preferential approach to forest conservation (e.g. Yos 1992; Anan 1998).

To a large extent, this controversy developed in the context of the drafting of a Community Forest Bill (CFB). Starting in the late 1980s, various drafts were fiercely disputed throughout the 1990s. In September 1999, pro-democracy, student, and peasant organizations successfully collected the 50.000 signatures required to submit a jointly negotiated 'people's draft' to parliament in March 2000, where it was passed in October 2001. However, this draft met heavy resistance in the Senate, which adopted it in March 2002 only with significant revisions. The most controversial point, regarding the possibility of community forests in protected areas and watershed areas, was denied by the majority in the Senate, which once more triggered public controversy and critique of distinguished international scholars. In December 2007, the National Legislative Assembly, set up after the military coup in 2006, approved the Bill just before dissolving, leaving its finalization to a new government. The problem of communities and community forests in protected

areas remains controversial (see Brenner et al. 1999; Sato 2003; Weatherby and Somying 2007).

2.2 'Hill tribes', forests, and ethnic discrimination

An ethnicist bias of the controversy regarding community forests in the PAS is frequently ignored in this debate: The vast majority of the estimated 12 million people living in forest reserves, where community forests are undisputed, are ethnic Tai³. The people living in areas designated for the PAS, the RFD's estimates in 1998 accounted for about 600.000, to a high degree are people of ethnic minority groups generally categorized as *chao khao* or 'hill tribes'. The reasons for this bias are rather obvious. Historically many of these groups migrated over the mountain ridges and adapted their economies to these living places. Some of them were forced to retreat into mountain areas by dominant valley populations. These mountain areas in large parts are the 'watersheds' to be included into the PAS. Most of the remaining 'natural forests' are to be found in mountain areas as well, as the deforestation process in Thailand started in the plains and valleys, and is most advanced there. In the early 1960s, the forests in northern and western Thailand - the settlement areas of the 'hill tribes' - accounted for about 55% of the total forest area. This share increased continuously up to about 68% in the early 1980s, and remained constant at about 69% until the late 1990s according to RFD statistics (Buergin 2002). After conservation forestry received priority, these remaining 'natural forests' were increasingly designated national parks and wildlife sanctuaries, in many instances enclosing settlement and land use areas of 'hill tribes'.

These 'hill tribes' or *chao khao* have a most precarious status in Thai society. Both terms came into use in the 1950s as generic names for various non-Tai ethnic groups (regarding diversity and history of these groups see e.g. McKinnon and Wanat 1983; McKinnon and Vienne 1989) living predominantly in the uplands of northern and western Thailand. Historically and ideologically the term *chao khao* is related to the term *chao pa* ('forest people'). Within the linguistic and cultural context of the various Tai ethnic groups of Southeast Asia, *pa* - referring to 'forest', 'wild', 'savage' - quite generally is conceived as opposite to *muang* - referring to 'civility' or the 'human do-

³ The term 'Tai' is used to refer to linguistic or ethnic categories, while 'Thai' indicates aspects of formal nationality and citizenship.

main'. Frequently, the pole of 'civility' was identified with dominating Tai groups, while the 'forest / wilderness' pole was related to marginal ethnic minority groups at the edge of the Tai polities (Stott 1991; Turton 2000).

During the second half of the 19th century, these 'forest people' lost their former importance for the ruling elites of the center and were left on their own (Renard 1980; Jørgensen 1998). It was not before the middle of the 20th century, when the state began to expand into the peripheral forest and mountain areas, that the *chao pa* re-emerged in national politics as the troublesome *chao khao*. Very soon, the term was identified with a negative stereotype of forest destroying, opium cultivating, dangerous non-Tai troublemakers. This stereotype became a widespread and influential image in Thailand, revived and exploited in the community forest debate and resource conflicts of the 1990s (Buergin 2003b; Pinkaew 2003).

State policies towards 'hill tribes', from the 1950s until today, have been concerned with the three problem areas attributed to them: opium cultivation, national security (read 'anti-communism'), and deforestation (read 'shifting cultivation'). During the 1960s and 1970s, the fight against opium cultivation and communist insurgency dominated hill tribe policies (Buergin 2000). By the mid-1980s, both issues had lost their urgency. By now, the settlement areas of the 'hill tribes' were those areas where most of the remaining forests were to be found. Furthermore, deforestation had become a matter of public interest and the 'hill tribes' were conceived of as the main 'problem group' regarding deforestation. Forest conservation became the dominant concern of hill tribe policies. At the same time, the Military turned to rural development and forest conservation as new tasks to justify contested political influence (Perapong 1992), and assumed a central role regarding hill tribe policies, now predominantly a resettlement policy (McKinnon and Vienne 1989).

On the local level likewise, conflicts between ethnic Tai and hill tribe groups rose during the 1980s. The spreading of ethnic Tai farmers into the uplands, as well as population growth and the extension of cash cropping by some of the hill tribe groups - induced and supported by international and national opium substitution programs - promoted resource conflicts over land, forests, and water. In the 1990s, ethnic discrimination became a crucial element in these conflicts (e.g. Buergin and Kessler 2000; Pinkaew 2000; Chusak 2008). In the context of a more or less outspoken Thai nationalism, even among high government officials, the territorial, social, and politi-

cal exclusion of the 'hill tribes' is pursued. Thai-ness is frequently related to a culturally defined pattern of livelihood and residence: living in valleys - not in the mountains or forests -, and growing paddy - not hill rice on swidden fields. In this frame, the Thai valley population and the nation are dependent on the undisturbed (unpopulated!) mountain forests that secure the national water supply and the ecological stability of the country.⁴ The 'hill tribes' already due to their place of residence and their way of livelihood exclude themselves from the Thai nation. Even worse, they threaten the welfare of the nation by destroying its forests. In the late 1990s, ethnic minority groups in the uplands increasingly were arbitrarily arrested, terrorized, and forcibly resettled. Arguably, evictions were not as frequent as anticipated in public discourses (Walker and Farrell 2008) - not least due to public awareness and resistance -, but growing coercions and pressures from state agencies and diverse interest groups were sorely experienced in many villages of ethnic minority groups (e.g. Buergin 2002).

In contrast, in the international debates on environment, development and indigenous rights, since the late 1980s, 'traditional', 'local' or 'indigenous' people increasingly were no longer conceived of as a threat to conservation, but as promising partners regarding biodiversity conservation. In the context of this international debate, in Thailand likewise an alternative image of 'benign environmentalists' emerged since the 1990s for at least part of the ethnic minority groups living in the uplands. The Karen ethnic minority group figured prominently in this reconceptualization. Contrary to the stereotype of the forest destroying 'hill tribes', still prevailing in the Thai public discourse, the Karen are increasingly referred to as 'people living in harmony with nature', as an example that 'people and forests can co-exist'. Though, this alternative image of environmentally benign, non-modern local communities, in Thailand just as in the international disputes, meets reproaches of undue generalization, outmoded historicity, or political exploitation (regarding Thailand see e.g. Walker 2001; Buergin 2003a; Pinkaew 2003; Yos 2004; Forsyth and Walker 2008).

⁴ For scientific challenges of the ecological assumptions of this position see e.g. Kunstadter, Chapman, and Sabhasri 1978; Forsyth 1996; Schmidt-Vogt 1997; Walker 2003.

3.1 History and identity of Karen in Thung Yai

The case of the Karen groups living in the Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary, on which the following account focuses, received considerable attention, but cannot be easily generalized⁵. Regarding their traditional forest and land use system, their social and political organization, as well as their values and world views, these groups resemble other Pwo Karen groups in many respects, even though a peculiar millenarian Buddhist sect is still very important in Thung Yai. However, in many other Karen communities in Thailand modernization processes have started earlier and are more important. Furthermore, population densities in other settlement areas of ethnic minority groups are often higher.

In the late 1990s, some 3.500 people were living in Thung Yai. They were almost exclusively ethnic Pwo Karen, born predominantly in Thailand, most of them within the sanctuary. According to their traditions, their ancestors had come to the area fleeing political and religious suppression in Burma after the Burmese had conquered the Mon Kingdoms of Lower Burma in the 18th century. In the early 19th century, Karen of this western border area received formal settlement rights from the Governor of Kanchanaburi and their leader was conferred the Siamese title *Khun Suwan*. When the status of the border area was raised to that of a *muang* or principality, between 1827 and 1839, the Karen leader of the *muang* was awarded the title of *Phra Si Suwannakhiri* by King Rama III. During the second half of the 19th century, this *muang* was of considerable importance for the Siamese Kings, guarding part of their western border with British-Burma. It was only in the beginning of the 20th century, after the establishment of the modern Thai nation state, that the Karen in Thung Yai lost their former status, re-appearing on the national political agenda as forest encroachers and illegal immigrants towards the end of the 20th century.

The Thai name *Thung Yai* - 'big field' - refers to a savannah in the centre of the sanctuary. In Karen language this place is called *pia aethala aethae*, which may be translated as 'place of the knowing sage'. The Karen term *aethae* - generally translated with the Tai term *rysi* referring to pre-Buddhist hermits or ascetics in the Mon Kingdom of Haripunjaya (Turton 2000) - refers to mythological hermits who, according to Karen lore, have lived and meditated in the savannah. As

⁵ On the history and social organization of different Karen groups see e.g. Keyes 1979; Renard 1979; Buergin 1992; Delang 2003.

'cultural heroes' they are important for the identity of the Karen in Thung Yai and are honored in a specific cult. Karen seeking spiritual development are still retreating to this place for meditation. To denote their community and homeland, the Karen in Thung Yai use the term *thong bou tai*. The term, in the first place, refers to a specific way of life and values, focusing on the control of greed and spiritual development. These conceptions mainly derive from the Telakho sect, a millenarian Buddhist sect which originated in the middle of the 19th century, possibly in or close to the present day sanctuary, and is still influential in Thung Yai (see Stern 1968; Ewers Andersen 1976; Buergin 2004). All the villages in the sanctuary, as well as some Karen villages at the edge of the sanctuary, are included in this culturally and geographically determined community.

The Karen in Thung Yai conceive themselves as people living in and of the forest, as part of a very complex community of plants, animals, humans, and spiritual beings. Within this community, the Karen do not feel superior, but rather as highly dependent on the various other beings and forces. Living in this community requires adaptation as well as specific knowledge about the interdependencies and rules of this community. Fostering relations to the various spiritual caretakers of this 'forest community' is an important part of Karen life in the sanctuary. Their permission and support has to be sought continuously in order to live in and use the forest and land. From a modern perspective, many of these rules and traditions may be labeled 'ecological knowledge'. In these rules and norms as well as in their daily practice of livelihood, passed on and transformed from generation to generation, a very rich and specific knowledge about the 'environment' of the Karen is conserved.

3.2 Expanding governance and local socio-cultural transformations

The Karen's relations with the outside world, specifically the 'Thai world', have changed frequently. Even though the villages in Thung Yai were formally integrated into the Thai nation state, the Karen communities were largely autonomous during the first half of the 20th century. It was not before the 1960s, in the wake of the growing interest of the state in its peripheral areas, that state institutions became of increasing relevance in Thung Yai: the Border Patrol Police (BPP) in the 1960s, followed by various state offices supporting 'development' as well as RFD and Military stations since the 1980s. The permanent presence of ethnic Tai in the Karen villages,

at first, primarily induced changes of the social, political, and religious organization of the Karen communities.

While most of the religious ideas and cults of the Karen resemble forms widely disseminated in Southeast Asia, their ancestor cult is regarded as Karen-specific (Mischung 1984, for a review of different forms and transformations of Karen ancestor cults see Buergin 1992). Until the 1960s, most of the households in Thung Yai practiced a form of the ancestor cult called *ong chre*, which may be translated as 'eating with the ancestors'. The cult group is based on matrilineal descent and the eldest female of the group generally functions as ritual head. In the ceremony, bamboo rats, fish, and prawn are caught, sacrificed, and eaten. It generally lasts three days and requires the participation of all members of the concerned group, whose size and composition may vary according to the occasion.

For households practicing *ong chre* it is forbidden to raise chicken and pigs, to consume alcohol, opium, and marijuana. Furthermore, *ong chre* requires the purity of the village, which has to be restored in an annual village ceremony called *bion tawong* ('cleaning the village'). The purity of the village likewise is offended by pigs and chicken or the consumption of drugs. During the annual village purification ceremony, which lasts three days, all villagers have to be present and all outsiders have to leave the village. These requirements became difficult to meet after ethnic Tai started to live in the Karen villages as government officials since the 1960s. As they generally raise pigs and chicken, and consume alcohol, they offend the purity of the village while simultaneously preventing its purification through their presence. Therefore many households adopted a new, less demanding form of the ancestor cult called *ba pho* ('to do flowers'). In 1996, about 16% of all households in the study area still practiced *ong chre*. 73% practiced the *ba pho* form of the cult, while less than 11% of the households reported not to practice any ancestor cult. The difference between *ong chre* and *ba pho* does not so much concern the definition of the cult groups, reasons, and objectives of the cult, but rather implies a relaxation and simplification of requirements, appreciated by many of the Karen.

The change of more and more households to *ba pho* was accompanied by transformations of the village organization. As long as *ong chre* was the predominating form of the ancestor cult, matrifocal cult groups were the most important social units structuring the community beyond the household level. The ritual head of one of the matrifocal cult groups, called *thei ku* ('head of the

tree'), had to foster the relation between the village and *rukkhajue*, the 'spirit of trees' who resided in a tree within the village called *thei waplieng*. The relation to the powerful spirit of the trees was crucial for the well-being of the village within the forest. The *thei ku* was also responsible for the keeping of the moral norms and the performance of the annual village purification ceremony. The permanent presence of ethnic Tai in the Karen communities made it difficult if not impossible to perform these functions. The change from the matrifocal *ong chre* to the more household centered *ba pho* form of the ancestor cult furthermore diminished the position of the *thei ku*. In the context of these changes, in most villages, the cult of the village tree *thei waplieng* and its spirit *rukkhajue* was substituted by a village cult called *priao*. With the prevailing of *ba pho* households and the *priao* village cult, the cult of the village tree loses its function to integrate the different matrifocal cult groups on the village level. The remaining *ong chre* households now have to maintain their relation to their cult tree and its spirit on an individual level. The new cult *priao* addresses a kind of village tutelary spirit called *phu pha du* or 'very old grandfather', who resides in a spirit house (*peow*) generally erected close to the Buddhist Wat. Compared to the cult of the village tree *thei waplieng*, with its reference to the forest spirit, the village cult *priao*, with its invocation of a 'grandfather', is more directed to a 'human' and 'male' sphere, shows closer spatial and ritual relations to the Buddhist Wat, and may be seen as a change towards more Thai-like forms of village organization. The village cult *priao* resembles a 'Cult of the Local Lord' recorded by Stern for the more assimilated Karen communities in the west of Sangklaburi (Stern 1990).

In Thung Yai the residence of ethnic Tai outsiders in the Karen villages since the 1960s has been the triggering factor initiating the decreasing importance of the *thei ku*, the matrifocal cult groups as well as the *ong chre* form of the ancestor cult. A decline of the ancestor cult or different transformations to easier forms of the cult have been reported from various Karen groups in Thailand and Burma, generally interpreted as deliberate adaptations due to convenience, religious conversion, increasing mobility or changing socio-economic circumstances (see Buergin 1992). Initially, constraints due to changing interethnic relations as in the case of Thung Yai may have been relevant in other cases too. Other factors supporting these transformations probably became more important later, such as the growing mobility and longer absence of cult group members due to education and work. Furthermore, the increasing importance of the village community as a political and social unit in the Thai administrative system likewise supported these changes.

3.3 Divergent political systems and cultural hegemony

The political organization of the communities as well underwent considerable changes in the context of national integration, specifically regarding the institution of the Phu Yai Ban (the village head in the context of the state administrative system) as formal interface between the Karen and Thai culture as well as between two different political systems. As long as the Karen and the Thai world had been widely separated, the main task of the Phu Yai Ban (PYB) was to represent - and shield - the village community towards outsiders and to serve for state institutions as contact to a world rather strange and generally quite uninteresting to those institutions. In the context of the internal, largely autonomous, egalitarian, and consensus oriented socio-political organization of the villages, the institution of the PYB was of rather little formal relevance. Since the PYB, most probably, was rhetorically skillful, had made experiences with the Thai world, and was a respected man from the village, his voice would also be heard in the internal disputes and decision processes of the community. However, his political influence in these internal disputes was not based on his external institutional background, but on his reputation and the role he played in the context of the 'traditional' socio-political organization of the community.

This changed with rising interests of the state in the local communities and their resources. Expectations and demands of state institutions towards the PYB to push through external interests in the villages grew, and the tasks of the PYB became more diverse. At the same time, he became more important for the village community as well as for the single households, be it in his function as mediator between external and internal interests, by way of his growing power to control and sanction, or due to his increasing capacities to allocate advantages. However, increasing external and internal importance rendered the position of the PYB more ambivalent and problematic, as both sides demand loyalty and engagement, often regarding contrary interests.

His delicate position is furthermore complicated because he has to act in and mediate between two very different political systems. As official in the state administrative body he is more or less the lowest rank within a highly hierarchic command structure. The successful performance of his role in this external system generally depends on his ability to perform and gain acceptance within the much more egalitarian 'internal' political system. In the context of this system he is first of

all one voice among others and has to defend his objectives as PYB while trying to reach consent. He is confronted with claims of loyalty to the community and has to face its possibilities of social control and sanctions.

The position of the PYB in Thung Yai changed once again with the establishment of the Tambon or Subdistrict Council in the 1980s. Now, for the first time, there exists a political institution above the village level that is predominantly filled with Karen. Furthermore, it has considerable monetary resources at its disposal compared to the total monetary income of all Karen households in the sanctuary. The Tambon Council meets once a month in the district capital in the house of the Kamnan (head of the Subdistrict) who, together with Thai officials, dominates the meeting attended by Karen representatives from the villages in the sanctuary. The purpose of the meetings is predominantly to inform the Karen villagers about activities and plans of the state agencies, as well as to request services and information from them. In the late 1990s, most of the Karen in the sanctuary regarded the Tambon Council as an external institution that did not represent and pursue the interests of the majority of the people. They criticized its orientation towards 'modernization' and many Karen complained that their 'representatives' in the context of the Tambon Council did not behave according to Karen norms. In this regard, the Tambon Council functions as an institution furthering the Thai-ization of the political leaders of the communities. Somehow outside of the Karen community, a certain type of PYB is 'socialized' in the context of the Tambon Council. In this context, the PYB are conformed to the requirements of the external administrative system to a much higher extent than this probably was possible before, when the single Karen PYB were rather isolated and 'alien' in the Thai administrative system.

Even more concerned are the Karen about the Thai schools in their villages. Until the 1960s, formal education in Thung Yai exclusively occurred through Karen Buddhist monks. The particular form of Buddhism practiced in Thung Yai is based on Mon-Buddhism and shows considerable differences compared to Thai-Buddhism. Even though Buddhist Wats with Karen monks are thoroughly integrated into the communities (in contrast to Wats staffed with Thai monks) and ethical norms of Buddhism are important for the Karen, Buddhism is not regarded as a genuine Karen form of religion. The first Thai school dates back to 1962, but most of the schools were not established before the mid-1980s. After a military coup in 1976, the area had been a retreat for political dissidents and communist resistance. Not before the beginning 1980s government troops

regained control over the whole area. The schools are mostly run by the Border Patrol Police (BPP). The BPP had been established with support from the CIA in 1951 as a paramilitary 'Territorial Defence Police' in reaction to the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in 1949. Apart from their task to protect the border areas and fight communist insurgencies, they became responsible for schools in hill tribe villages to support their assimilation. Most of the Karen conceive of the education of their children in these schools as a major problem regarding the transmission of their own values, worldviews, and experiences. There the children learn nothing about Karen culture. Quite contrary, their own culture is deliberately debased by the Thai teachers, and all-day schooling in Thai schools considerably restricts their experiences with their parent's everyday life as well as efforts of Karen elders to establish supplementing Karen schools.

3.4 Nature conservation, resettlement, and coercive modernization

Until the 1980s, the extension of state institutions into the peripheral areas triggered predominantly transformations and adaptations of the social, political, and ideological organization of the Karen communities in Thung Yai. Profound changes of their economic organization did not occur before the late 1980s and are closely related to the declaration of Thung Yai as a protected area. The wildlife sanctuary was established in 1974, after years of conflicts about logging and mining concessions and a prominent poaching scandal which became kind of a catalyst for the overthrow of the military dictatorship in October 1973. In 1987/88 Thung Yai attracted international attention in the disputes about the construction of the Nam Choan Dam which would have flooded most of the sanctuary. After the dam project was stopped due to the protest of a broad public alliance, the international community acknowledged the outstanding ecological value of Thung Yai by declaring it a Natural World Heritage Site in 1991. Together with the adjoining Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuary they constitute the core area of the Western Forest Complex, Thailand's largest remaining forest area with considerable importance regarding biodiversity conservation in mainland Southeast Asia as well as globally. Since the establishment of the sanctuary, villages have been removed, and with the declaration as a World Heritage Site the remaining Karen villages became a political issue. To induce them to resettle 'voluntarily', the Royal Forest Department and the Military use violence and restrictions on their land use system.

In the late 1990s, most households in Thung Yai were living on subsistence farming under a commons regime. They predominantly grew rice on swidden fields and some paddy fields. The swidden is normally used to grow hill rice for one year. After the rice is harvested, the field is left fallow for several years, while numerous plants growing on the fallow area are used continuously. Long fallow periods of 5 – 15 years, together with specific cultivation techniques, support the long-term productivity of the soils. Assuming a mean fallow period of 10 years, the total agricultural area in the sanctuary - including fallow areas - accounts for about 1% of its total area. Probably at least since the middle of the 19th century, Karen in Thung Yai have gained small monetary incomes by selling traditional 'cash crops' like chili and tobacco, forest products, and domestic animals. These income sources are important for the subsistence economy of most of the households until today. Since the late 1980s, monetary incomes increased considerably mainly due to wage labor outside of the sanctuary, even though very moderately in absolute terms. The mean annual cash income per person in 1996 was less than 50 US\$, and for more than a third it was below 20 US\$. There was no evidence for a general shift from a subsistence to a market orientation.

The future of the subsistence economy of the Karen in Thung Yai depends much more directly on the restrictions of the RFD on their land use system. In the beginning of the 1990s, in the process of nominating the Wildlife Sanctuary for a World Heritage Site, the RFD had tried to finally settle its problem of people living in the sanctuary by removing them. Due to unexpected strong public criticism, the RFD had to revoke its resettlement scheme for the time being. Instead, the RFD concentrated on the prohibition of the use of fallow areas older than three years. In the longer term, this restriction necessarily will lead to the breakdown of the traditional land use system, as the soils under constant use lose their productivity. In the villages where control through RFD and Military was most effective, people already reported decreasing yields in the second half of the 1990s. Furthermore, in 2002, the RFD started to plant tree seedlings on swidden fields in some villages, leaving the Karen to choose between being charged as forest destroyers or facing severe subsistence problems.

The only possibility for the Karen to adapt to these restrictions - apart from trying to avoid them - seems to be economic modernization. They may either try to increase the productivity of the fields, using fertilizers and pesticides, which most of them cannot afford, or turn to cash cropping in, or wage labor outside of the sanctuary. Intensification of agriculture and cash cropping is

already propagated by some of the government institutions and NGOs working in the sanctuary. But most of the Karen in Thung Yai try to carry on with subsistence farming. Furthermore, intensification of land use, cash cropping, and increased market orientation endangers their reputation as 'forest people living in harmony with nature'.

3.5 Local resistance and transcultural alliances

Far from being 'comfortable' for the Karen (see Buergin 2003a), this positive image of 'benign environmentalists', attributed to the Karen in Thung Yai in parts of the national and international public discourses, is presently the only position in these discourses to which they can relate at least to some degree, and it is their most important asset in the debates that will decide about the future of their villages. So far, the Karen in Thung Yai had no chance to participate directly in the national and international decision-making regarding their homeland. In their encounters with state agencies they frequently feel right- and powerless.

To defend their rights and interests they depend on advocates. They find their allies in the peasant and civil society movement that grew out of the conflicts about forest reserves and forest policies in the 1980s. However, for the Karen it is an ambivalent and precarious 'alliance'. Among them strong feelings prevail that they cannot communicate their own view adequately, even towards their Thai allies among NGOs and activists. To justify their claims they have to use words, arguments, and ideas that are not really their own. The Karen conceive these 'communication problems' not predominantly as a language problem - even though many of the elder Karen have only limited competence in Thai language -, but attribute them to different cultural contexts. Furthermore, their interests and aims may not always go together.

Even though all of the Karen in Thung Yai believe that resettlement is neither justified nor desirable, they take different positions towards external influences. There is a rather small group, including most of the Phu Yai Ban and the Kamnan, which is open for a moderate economic modernization. Their readiness for change frequently goes along with considerable personal interests in commercial utilizations of communal lands for orchards and gardens or local manpower for small manufacturing businesses. But even these 'moderate modernists' do not want to abandon their local Karen identity. The vast majority is rather more reluctant to modernization, preferring

to "live like our grandparents did" as a common saying goes. Among them, there are marked differences in their reaction to external challenges and allies. A rather big group, including many influential elders as well as young people, may be labeled 'extroverted traditionalists'. They are trying to shape the changes by strengthening Karen culture and identity, as well as seeking support from outside of Thung Yai. They emphatically participate in activities promoting environmental awareness, sustainable resource management, and the preservation of indigenous knowledge. Another group of more 'introverted traditionalists' also focuses on 'tradition', but invokes to a higher degree millenarian and more exclusive frames of Karen culture. They base their hopes on a strict compliance to the rules of a local millenarian Buddhist sect and its promises of redemption. Regarding their relation to non-Karen outsiders, they rather tend to avoid transcultural exchange and support.

Despite their differences in position and strategy, all groups wish to remain in their villages as well as to protect their culture and homeland, even if offered improved living standards outside of the sanctuary. Furthermore, they all refer to the same cultural frame of values and objectives regarding a decent life appropriate for a Karen living in Thung Yai. These values and objectives focus on the concepts of 'modesty' in opposition to 'greed', 'harmony' in contrast to conflict, as well as 'spiritual development' versus 'material development'. For them, these objectives are substantially related to a subsistence oriented livelihood and a self-image as 'people who live in the forest'. These value-orientations, rooted in common Buddhist as well as locally specific millenarian conceptualizations, are sharpened - but not created - in the clashes with external actors and influences. In the eyes of the Karen, the counterpart to these conceptions is primarily the modern Thai society which is increasingly intruding into their traditional living places and spaces, threatening their existence.

4.1 Modern challenges and local rights

In conflicts about biocultural diversity the local, national, and international level are highly interdependent as well as asymmetric. Transformations on the national and international level involving shifting framings of the 'problem' Karen in Thung Yai significantly determined the situation of the local communities (see Buergin 2003b). In the second half of the 19th century, economic

and political interests of colonial and regional powers in Southeast Asia brought about the demarcation of territorial nation-states according to western models. In the context of this national territorialization, Thung Yai and the Karen living there were enclosed in the 'geo-body' of the Siamese nation-state, which at the same time became part of an international community of states primarily defined in terms of territory and economic relations, while heterogeneous social and physical spaces were merged in the modern nation-state. In the first half of the 20th century, the development of a specific national identity of this state focused on a common language, Buddhism, and the monarchy. The Karen in Thung Yai, which had been incorporated into the state spatially, were now excluded from its 'people-body' in the context of this nationalization process and disappeared from the political agenda. Since the middle of the 20th century, growing international and national interests in the resources and people of the peripheral areas of the state, in the context of modernization strategies and the fight against communism, resulted in the extension of state institutions into these areas as well as their exploitation for national economic development. The people living there were now predominantly conceived of as backward problem groups or alien troublemakers in conflict with national interests, which had to be controlled and modernized. After the costs of these economic developments became obvious since the 1980s, the forests of these peripheral areas were declared precious wilderness and biodiversity-assets of global significance which had to be protected against encroachments from local people in the context of a global ecologization of peripheral areas of modernity. In this frame, the Karen in Thung Yai became a disruptive factor in a natural global heritage, requiring strict monitoring as long as their removal is not feasible.

Locally, for the Karen in Thung Yai, the most important changes and challenges induced by national and international modernization processes are the decreasing importance of matrifocal kinship groups accompanied by the emergence of a more household centered and patrifocal village cult; the frictions between a predominantly egalitarian and consensus oriented internal versus a more authoritarian and hierarchical external political system; the challenge of the tradition of their values and way of life due to the Thai education system; and, most urgently, the threat of their subsistence economy and existence in Thung Yai by way of restrictions on their land use system, resettlement threats, and coercive modernization.

The Karen have almost unanimously expressed their wish to stay in Thung Yai, and most of

the international observers would probably agree that they have a right to do so. In international environmental discourses, by now, forced resettlement is hardly a legitimate option anymore, participation and cooperative resource management are prominent concepts in protected area management. Even from a utilitarian perspective, the resettlement of the Karen or the prohibition of their subsistence oriented swidden system are unreasonable regarding objectives of nature conservation. After having adopted Thung Yai as a global heritage, concerned international organizations should disapprove the pressures and violence towards the Karen. When Thung Yai was declared a Natural World Heritage Site in 1991, the Karen were only perceived as a 'disruptive factor' (Seub and Stewart-Cox 1990). The studies done there since then clearly indicate that the Karen are an integral part of Thung Yai (Chan-ek, Kulvadee, and Ambrosino 1995; Steinmetz and Mather 1996; Kulvadee 1997; Steinmetz 1999; Buergin 2002, 2004; Delang and Wong 2006). With their sustainable land use system they have shaped the sanctuary considerably over a long time and increased its biodiversity. In their culture they keep a unique body of knowledge about their natural environment to which they maintain a specific and deep spiritual relationship. This history and relationship even suggests a reconsideration of the status of Thung Yai, which may be better conceived of as a Cultural Landscape World Heritage Site (see e.g. von Droste, Plachter, and Rössler 1995; UNESCO 2003).

Forces which support either the exclusion or a complete assimilation of the ethnic minority groups categorized as 'hill tribes', including their removal out of protected areas, are still strong in Thailand. However, over the last 30 years, Thailand underwent a remarkable process of democratization and has enacted a constitution in 1997 that explicitly grants rights to local communities to cultural self-determination as well as to the use of local resources. Unfortunately, these commitments are not always easily realizable. Furthermore, their interpretation is often contested and subject to social bargaining, where weaker social groups may be at a disadvantage. The still pending Community Forest Bill is a case in point where these problematic asymmetries urgently need to be reconsidered, specifically regarding the vulnerable position of ethnic minority groups in the uplands. The case of the Karen in Thung Yai as well as the more general problem of integrating the 'hill tribes' into Thai society remains a challenge for democratic forces in Thailand. Evident, supposed or assigned differences between social groups are frequently highlighted and exploited in these struggles about resources, redistribution, identity, societal status and power (see e.g. Keyes 1997, 2002; Johnson and Fosyth 2002; Vandergeest 2003; Connors

2005). Not least, these struggles are significantly framed and negotiated in discourses about national identities and cultural diversity which unavoidably invoke disputed conceptualizations of modernity.

4.2 Conflicts about biocultural diversity and modern identities

Conflicts involving simultaneously issues of biological and cultural diversity are not confined to Thailand, but concern extensive populations globally and receive increasing attention in conceptualizations of a global environmental crisis. Estimates account for some 370 Mio so called indigenous people (World Bank 2004) supposed to represent about two thirds of the global linguistic diversity (Colchester 2001), most of them trying to protect ways of life distinct from a modern way of life in one way or another. Not all, but many of these groups live in places with a specifically high biological diversity. World Bank estimates regarding people living in or close to forest areas depending on forest resources for subsistence reach to about 600 Mio people. The transformations and developments on the international, national, and local level, which were reviewed in this paper with regard to the modernization of Thailand and the case of the Karen in Thung Yai, reflect a more general pattern of the spreading of modernity and its changing relations to peripheral, non-modern groups.

To distinguish between modern and non-modern social groups, nowadays, is neither popular nor easy in the social sciences. This is not least due to strong value-connotations of earlier concepts of 'modernity' versus 'pre-modern' or 'traditional' groups, which most scholars prefer to avoid, as well as a kind of intrinsic paradigm emphasizing universality and equality specifically in critical or emancipatory social and human science traditions. Furthermore, institutions and traits of modernity by now are so ubiquitous that they have gained a kind of 'naturalness' - may be most important in this regard the territorial nation state which has become the container unit of social science research (e.g. Beck and Sznaider 2006) - which facilitates a common neglect of non-modern social groups in sciences and politics, and makes it very difficult for these groups at the fringes of modernity to claim and sustain different ways of living and world views.

The basic processes producing or constituting modernity most often have been identified as rationalization, functional differentiation, and individualization (for a comprehensive reader on di-

verse conceptualizations of 'modernity' see e.g. Waters 1999). Ideas or imaginary significations of mastery (controllability, discipline), progress (perfectibility, growth), autonomy (self-determination, emancipation), and equality (solidarity, justice) are conceived of as constitutive elements of modern identity - frequently conceptualized as creative dialectical antagonisms in diverse configurations while emphasizing the changeability or 'processuality' of modernity (e.g. Friese and Wagner 2000; Wagner 2001; Koopman 2010). As core-institutions of modernity the territorial nation-state with a bureaucratic governance, science as truth-generating and democracy as legitimizing institutions, an economic organization (predominantly capitalist) based on wage labor and the production and consumption of commodities, as well as expansive and exploitative environmental relations figure prominently in social science discourses (e.g. Beck and Lau 2005).⁶ However, disputes about the determination of 'modernity' are highly controversial and, since the 1970s, conceptions of modernity are fiercely contested in academic discourses to the point of indicating a crisis of modern identity.⁷

'Modernity' as a prominent social science concept emerged in the 1970s in reaction to increasing conceptual difficulties in modernization theories and critical theories of capitalism (Wagner 2001). In both theoretical traditions, 'non-modern' social groups were predominantly conceived of as 'pre-modern'. 'Postmodern' deconstructions of modern claims on truth and hegemony questioned this historical trajectory and postulated a sharp break with 'modernity', but rather employed 'universalistic' and 'self-referential' perspectives with little concern for non-modern social groups (e.g. Habermas 1981; Lyotard 1984). This perspective is also dominant in conceptions of 'reflexive', 'second', or 'liquid' modernities which rather emphasize the continuity of modernity and focus on new social and ecological problems coming to the fore in the 1980s (e.g. Giddens 1991; Bauman 2000; Beck and Lau 2005). Concepts like 'multiple modernity', 'varieties of modernity', or 'entangled modernities' emerged in the context of the globalization discourses of the 1990s.

⁶ In more 'popular' discourses, ideologies of competition and struggle clad in Darwinian terminologies have widely gained a kind of paradigmatic status as *agens movens* or ultimate reason of modern social relations and societies, frequently accompanied by narratives of man as self-serving economic calculator and anticipations of unlimited growth.

⁷ See e.g. various 'special issues' of leading social science journals: *British Journal of Sociology* 51:1 (2000); *Daedalus* 129:1 (2000); *International Sociology* 16:3 (2001); *European Journal of Social Theory* 6:3 (2003); *British Journal of Sociology* 57:1 (2006).

They rather highlight diversity within modernity, while likewise sharing a predominantly universalistic perspective (e.g. Therborn 2003; Schmidt 2006; Lee 2008). Even explicitly particularistic conceptions of 'modernity as civilization' are more interested in differences and interrelations between diverse modern (or rapidly modernizing) societies with different socio-cultural organization than in interrelations between modern and non-modern social groups (see Eisenstadt 2001; Tiryakian 2001). Notwithstanding the great diversity of these approaches to conceptualize 'modernity', most recent theorizing of modernity tends to employ universalistic perspectives, either neglecting, dissolving or engulfing non-modern social groups conceptually.⁸

Historically, the particular roots of 'modernity' in occidental societies are easily discernible and rarely questioned, even though the beginnings of this 'culture of modernity' may be located variously by different scholars somewhere between 1500 and 1900 (e.g. Münch 1986). Real encounters between modern and non-modern social groups have a long, predominantly ambivalent if not embarrassing history in the context of the expansion of modernity (e.g. Bodley 1975; Wolf 1982; Wesseling 1997). In this process, the exploitation of natural and social resources at the fringes of modern societies and attendant conflicts as well as othering and identity-building have always been important issues (e.g. Bitterli 1976; Said 1993; Richards 2003).

In the framework of the modernization and conservation paradigms of the 1950s and 60s, for instance, the non-modern 'other' of modernity frequently has been subsumed under the concept of the 'traditional', predominantly indicating backwardness, rigidity, immutability and simplicity versus modern progressiveness, dynamism, changeability and complexity.⁹ In this framing, 'non-modern' groups generally were 'pre-modern': as 'traditional' candidates for modernization they were either conceived of as a possible threat to 'nature', or were virtually identified with 'nature' as 'primitive people' - determined to vanish but may be even worth of conservation as long as declining development. While this dichotomous and diachronic conceptualization of modernity versus tradition was most pronounced in modernization theory, now widely regarded as somehow 'outmoded', it remains an influential image until today.

⁸ For an exception explicitly pointing to the problem non-modern social groups pose for contemporary theorizing of 'modernity' see e.g. Arnason 1986.

⁹ For more sophisticated views on this dichotomy see e.g. Shils 1981; Heelas, Lash, and Morris 1996.

Since the 1970s, these stereotypes were increasingly questioned and new discourses emphasizing diversity in 'nature' and 'culture' came to constitute the ideological and discursive context of conflicts about biocultural diversity. The particularity of these conflicts is related to recent tendencies which may be labeled as 'ecologization' of the natural and social periphery of modernity.¹⁰ A growing awareness for the costs and risks of exploitative and expansionist environmental relations of modern societies reinforced critical reflections of these relations and induced a re-framing of their periphery. 'Natural spaces' not yet extensively altered by modern forms of human utilization now were widely conceptualized as threatened 'wilderness' and important resources in the context of an urgently needed global resource management under ecological premises. At the same time, people living in or close to these natural spaces, predominantly culturally diverse social groups at the fringes or outside of modern societies, came into the focus of the ecological re-framing of peripheral spaces, be it as threats to 'wilderness' and biodiversity, as ecologically noble savages, or as potential partners in biodiversity conservation.

This ecologization of the peripheral natural and social spaces of modernity, to a high degree, determines the options, threats, and chances of the diverse modern and non-modern actors involved in conflicts about biocultural diversity. For non-modern local groups, this re-framing very often implied increasing threats of resettlement in the context of the wilderness-paradigm and fortress-conservation approaches, of being tied down as 'noble savages' lacking capacities or rights to development, or of becoming objects and subjects of more or less coercive modernization strategies. However, even though the ecologization of the periphery is a modern project - predominantly conceptualized in discourses among modern actors reflecting their particular concerns and interests while non-modern local people concerned are still largely excluded from these discourses - this new framing also provides new chances for non-modern actors to claim rights to local resources as well as separate identities and self-determination.

Over and above that, conflicts about biocultural diversity have become an important 'battlefield' in the disputes about the determination of 'modernity', specifically regarding the problem of conceptualizing 'cultural diversity'¹¹ and reflecting about modern identities from the perspective

¹⁰ Concomitant tendencies of an 'economization' of these peripheries cannot be addressed adequately in the context of this paper, see e.g. ten Kate and Laird 2000; Perelman 2003; Brockington and Duffy 2010.

¹¹ Even though diverse definitions and uses of the term 'culture' are most significant in this context, ambiguities due

of the other. In this context, conflicts about biocultural diversity point to a basic problematic related to modern conceptualizations of cultural diversity. In these conflicts, modernity - emphasizing at the same time the protection of biological and cultural diversity - meets communities with different, non-modern ways of life and world views. These encounters have been framed differently in history, be it in terms of unequal colonial dependencies, evolutionary gradation, or 'traditional' societies craving for modernity. In all these frames, the relation between modern and non-modern groups have been highly asymmetrical and the latter conceived of as afflicted with a kind of deficiency, frequently going along with modern claims for universality based in ideas of the enlightenment, evolutionism, or modernization theory. Related concepts of 'cultural diversity' were either based on a pre-eminent and hegemonic position of modernity within this diversity, or removed modernity from the spheres of cultural diversity from the outset in universalistic conceptions beyond diversity.

Contemporary conceptualizations of cultural difference and diversity have to struggle with similar problems of 'contradictory complementarities' like social asymmetries vs. human equality, exclusive discrimination vs. neglecting inclusiveness, particularity vs. universality. Multiculturalist concepts of cultural diversity are predominantly based on 'cultural', religious, and/or ethnic differences of social groups within nation states. Scholarly as well as political disputes about difference and equality tend to focus on ambiguous interrelations between redistribution and recognition, societal status and power, identity and rights of social groups (e.g. Taylor and Gutmann 1992; Kymlicka 1995; Fraser and Honneth 2003). These are important issues in conflicts about biocultural diversity too. However, differences between modern and non-modern groups are widely disregarded in these discourses generally implying a kind of 'global modernity' beyond cultural diversity which makes it rather difficult to take a perspective on modernity from 'outside'. Communitarian perspectives on cultural diversity tend to employ a particularistic and quite often more critical conception of 'modernity'. In principle, this perspective facilitates a regard for dif-

to undetermined or diverging concepts of culture are rarely reflected in disputes about 'modernity' and modern conceptualizations of 'cultural diversity'. Unfortunately, this problem cannot be further pursued here. This paper basically employs an anthropological concept of culture, but rejects essentializing and 'exclusionary' notions often related to this approach. It rather emphasizes change and processuality in 'culture' and conceptually assumes multiple individual affiliations to diverse 'cultures'. Regarding debates on conceptualizations of 'culture' in *Current Anthropology* see for example Brumann 1999; Boggs 2004; Brown 2008.

ferences between modern and non-modern groups, but seems to be rather susceptible to 'exclusive' and self-centered conceptualizations of community as well as competitive and hierarchic notions of interrelations between different social groups (e.g. Walzer 1990; Etzioni 1993; Bader 1995). In contrast, cosmopolitan approaches predominantly focus on equal individual rights. Emphasizing equality and social justice in the context of an 'inclusive' global community, they are generally less sensitive regarding particularities of social groups and cultural diversity (e.g. Pogge 1992; Mehta 2000; Beck and Sznaider 2006). Typically based on a normative ethos of 'egalitarian universalism' deeply rooted in modernity, they rather tend to neglect differences between modernity and its 'others' looking forward to a globalized enlightenment (Habermas 2005).

This paper is in search of something like an ethos of 'egalitarian particularism'. It argues against 'exclusive' concepts of cultural difference and diversity going along with a 'particularistic' modern self-concept, be it in the context of modernization-paradigms based on development-trajectories from 'tradition' to 'modernity' (- anticipating modern 'universality'), or in communitarian terms of closed and naturalized 'cultures' or 'communities' in contest. It likewise questions 'inclusive' concepts of cultural diversity in the context of a 'global modernity' conceived of as an encompassing universal social entity beyond cultural diversity, be it in multicultural or cosmopolitan conceptualizations of cultural difference within modernity. It rather calls for concepts of cultural diversity and self-conceptualizations of modernity which facilitate explorations of interrelations between a particular 'culture of modernity' and diverse non-modern social entities on equal terms - in the context of a growing awareness for the significance and endangerment of cultural diversity which requires efforts to preserve and support diversity.

At this point it is not possible to depict a coherent and comprehensive account of such a conception of modernity and cultural diversity based on an ethos of egalitarian particularism. This paper predominantly employed an inductive approach by analyzing the expansion of modern social groups and institutions into peripheral non-modern areas with a focus on a specific conflict in which the distinction between 'modern' and 'non-modern' groups and ways of life is rather obvious and does not require a sharp definition from the outset. From such a historical and empirical perspective naturalizations of modern institutions as well as universalistic conceptions of modernity become arguable. The Karen in Thung Yai hardly fit into conceptions of cultural diversity based on a universalistic self-image of modernity. They may find a place in a concept of cultural

diversity that acknowledges modernity as a particular culture without claiming a universal or paramount position. A culture of modernity being part of and appreciating such a concept of cultural diversity has to be attentive of its hegemonic and violating relations to non-modern groups, and supportive of ways of life different from its own. Such a 'relativistic' conceptualization of cultural diversity does not rule out searching for and negotiating urgently needed 'universal' rules for an emerging global community in diversity (e.g. Deveaux 2000; Benhabib 2002). However, it requires a self-reflexive and alterity-oriented culture of modernity which is able to reconsider universalistic claims and self-conceptions.

References:

- AAA (American Anthropological Association). 1947. Statement on human rights. *American Anthropologist* 49(4):539-543.
- Anan Ganjanapan. 1998. The politics of conservation and the complexity of local control of forests in the Northern Thai highlands. *Mountain Research and Development* 18(1):71-82.
- Arnason, Johann Pall. 1986. Die Moderne als Projekt und Spannungsfeld. In *Kommunikatives Handeln*. Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, eds. Pp. 278-326. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Bader, Veit. 1995. Citizenship and Exclusion. *Political Theory* 23(2):211-246.
- Banasopit Mekvichai. 1988. The teak industry in North Thailand. Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, Ithaca.
- Bauman, Zygmunt. 2000. *Liquid modernity*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Beck, Ulrich, and Christoph Lau. 2005. Second modernity as a research agenda. *British Journal of Sociology* 56(4):525-557.
- Beck, Ulrich, and Natan Sznaider. 2006. Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences. *British Journal of Sociology* 57(1):1-23.
- Benhabib, Seyla. 2002. *The claims of culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Berkes, Fikret, ed. 1989. *Common property resources*. London: Belhaven.
- Bitterli, Urs. 1976. *Die 'Wilden' und die 'Zivilisierten'*. München: C.H. Beck.
- Bodley, John H. 1975. *Victims of progress*. Menlo Park: Cummings.
- Boggs, James P. 2004. The culture concept as theory, in context. *Current Anthropology* 45(2):187-209.
- Borgerhoff Mulder, Monique, and Peter Coppolillo. 2005. *Conservation: linking ecology, economics, and culture*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Brechin, Steven R., Peter R. Wilshusen, Crystal L. Fortwangler, and Patrick C. West, eds. 2003.

- Contested nature*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Brenner, Verena, Reiner Buergin, Christl Kessler, Oliver Pye, Rainer Schwarzmeier, and Rolf-Dieter Sprung. 1999. *Thailand's community forest bill: u-turn or roundabout in forest policy?* SEFUT Working Paper 3. Freiburg: Albert-Ludwigs-Universität.
- Briggs, John, and Joanne P. Sharp. 2004. Indigenous knowledges and development. *Third World Quarterly* 25(4):661-676.
- Brockington, Dan, and Rosaleen Duffy. 2010. Capitalism and conservation. *Antipode* 42(3):469-484.
- Brockington, Dan, and James Igoe. 2006. Eviction for conservation. *Conservation and Society* 4(3):424-470.
- Brokensha, David W., Dennis Michael Warren, and Oswald Werner, eds. 1980. *Indigenous knowledge systems and development*. Washington: University Press of America.
- Bromley, Daniel W., ed. 1992. *Making the commons work*. San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies.
- Brown, Michael F. 2003. *Who owns native culture?* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- . 2008. Cultural relativism 2.0. *Current Anthropology* 49(3):363-383.
- Brumann, Christoph. 1999. Writing for culture. *Current Anthropology* (Special Issue: Culture. A second chance?) 40:1-27.
- Brundtland, Gro Harlem, ed. 1987. *Our common future*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Buege, Douglas J. 1996. The ecologically noble savage revisited. *Environmental Ethics* 18(1):71-88.
- Buergin, Reiner. 1992. Die Karen: Ideologie, Interessen und Kultur. MSc thesis, Institute for Ethnology, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg.
- . 2000. *'Hill tribes' and forests*. SEFUT Working Paper 7. Freiburg: Albert-Ludwigs-Universität.
- . 2002. Lokaler Wandel und kulturelle Identität im Spannungsfeld nationaler Modernisierung und globaler Umweltdiskurse. PhD dissertation, Institute for Ethnology, Albert-Ludwigs-Universität, Freiburg.
- . 2003a. Trapped in environmental discourses and politics of exclusion. In *Living at the edge of Thai society*. Claudio O. Delang, ed. Pp. 43-63. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- . 2003b. Shifting frames for local people and forests in a global heritage. *Geoforum* 34(3):375-393.
- . 2004. *Umweltverhältnisse jenseits von Tradition und Moderne*. Stuttgart: Ibidem.
- Buergin, Reiner, and Christl Kessler. 1999. *Das Janusgesicht der Zivilgesellschaft*. SEFUT Working Paper 6. Freiburg: Albert-Ludwigs-Universität.
- . 2000. Intrusions and exclusions: democratization in Thailand in the context of environmental discourses and resource conflicts. *GeoJournal* 52(1):71-80.

- Ceballos-Lascuráin, Héctor, ed. 1996. *Tourism, ecotourism, and protected areas*. Gland: IUCN.
- Cernea, Michael M., ed. 1985. *Putting people first*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Chan-ek Tangsubutra, Kulvadee Boonpinon, and Mario Ambrosino. 1995. The traditional farming system of the Karen of Sanehpong village, Thung-Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary, Kanchanaburi Province, Thailand. In *Community development and conservation of forest biodiversity through community forestry*, H. Wood, M. McDaniel, and K. Warner, eds. Pp. 193-199. Bangkok: RECOFTC.
- Chusak Wittayapak. 2008. History and geography of identifications related to resource conflicts and ethnic violence in Northern Thailand. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 49(1):111–127.
- Cocks, Michelle. 2006. Biocultural diversity: moving beyond the realm of 'indigenous' and 'local' people. *Human Ecology* 34(2):185-200.
- Connors, Michael Kelly. 2003. *Democracy and national identity in Thailand*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- . 2005. Ministering culture. *Critical Asian Studies* 37(4):523-551.
- Delang, Claudio O., ed. 2003. *Living at the edge of Thai society*. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Delang, Claudio O., and Theresa Wong. 2006. The livelihood-based forest classification system of the Pwo Karen in Western Thailand. *Mountain Research and Development* 26(2):138–145.
- Deveaux, Monique. 2000. *Cultural pluralism and dilemmas of justice*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Eisenstadt, Shmuel Noah. 2001. The civilizational dimension of modernity. *International Sociology* 16(3):320-340.
- Etzioni, Amitai. 1993. *The spirit of community*. New York: Crown.
- Ewers Andersen, Kirsten. 1976. The Karens and the Dhamma-rajā. Thesis, Copenhagen.
- Feeny, David. 1982. *The political economy of productivity: Thai agricultural development, 1880-1975*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.
- Forsyth, Timothy J. 1996. Science, myth and knowledge. *Geoforum* 27(3):375-392.
- Forsyth, Timothy J., and Andrew Walker. 2008. *Forest guardians, forest destroyers: the politics of environmental knowledge in Northern Thailand*. Washington: University of Washington Press.
- Fraser, Nancy, and Axel Honneth. 2003. *Umverteilung oder Anerkennung?* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Friese, Heidrun, and Peter Wagner. 2000. When 'the light of the great cultural problems moves on': on the possibility of a cultural theory of modernity. *Thesis Eleven* 61(1):25-40.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and self-identity*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. Modernity versus postmodernity. *New German Critique* 22:3-14.
- . 2005. Equal treatment of cultures and the limits of postmodern liberalism. *Journal of Po-*

- litical Philosophy* 13(1):1-28.
- Harmon, David. 2002. *In light of our differences: how diversity in nature and culture makes us human*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Headland, Thomas N. 1997. Revisionism in ecological anthropology. *Current Anthropology* 38(4):605-630
- Heelas, Paul, Scott Lash, and Paul Morris, eds. 1996. *Detraditionalization*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Heinz, Wolfgang S. 1991. *Indigenous populations, ethnic minorities and human rights*. Saarbrücken: Breitenbach.
- Hinch, Tom D. 2004. Indigenous people and tourism. In *A companion to tourism*. A. A. Lew, M. C. Hall, and A. M. Williams, eds. Pp. 246-257. Malden: Blackwell.
- Hines, Colin. 2000. *Localization: a global manifesto*. London: Earthscan.
- Hirsch, Philip H. 1987. Deforestation and development in Thailand. *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 8(2):129-138.
- IUCN, and Jeffrey A. McNeely, eds. 1993. *Parks for live*. Gland: IUCN.
- IUCN, and WCPA. *Recommendations of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress*. IUCN; WCPA 2003 [<http://www.iucn.org/wpc2003/>; cited September 2003].
- Jeanrenaud, Sally. 2002. *People-oriented approaches in global conservation*. London: IIED.
- Jentoft, Svein, Henry Minde, and Ragnar Nilsen, eds. 2003. *Indigenous peoples: resource management and global rights*. Delft: Eburon.
- Johnson, Craig, and Timothy J. Forsyth. 2002. In the eyes of the state: negotiating a 'rights-based approach' to forest conservation in Thailand. *World Development* 30(9):1591-1605.
- Jørgensen, Anders Baltzer. 1998. Karen natural resources management and relations to state polity. In *Facets of power and its limitations*. I.-B. Trankell and L. Summers, eds. Pp. 213-238. Uppsala: Uppsala University.
- ten Kate, Kerry, and Sarah A. Laird. 2000. *The commercial use of biodiversity*. London: Earthscan.
- Keyes, Charles Fenton, ed. 1979. *Ethnic adaptation and identity: The Karen on the Thai frontier with Burma*. Philadelphia: Institute for the Study of Human Issues.
- . 1997. Cultural diversity and national identity in Thailand. In *Government policies and ethnic relations in Asia and the Pacific*. M. E. Brown and Š. Ganguly, eds. Pp. 197-231. Cambridge: MIT Press.
- . 2002. Presidential Address: 'The Peoples of Asia' - Science and politics in the classification of ethnic groups in Thailand, China, and Vietnam. *Journal of Asian Studies* 61(4):1163-1203.
- Kingsbury, Benedict. 1998. 'Indigenous peoples' in international law. *American Journal of International Law* 92(3):414-457.
- Koopman, Colin. 2010. Revising Foucault: the history and critique of modernity. *Philosophy & Social Criticism* 36(5):545-565.

- Krauss, Michael. 1996. Linguistics and biology: Threatened linguistic and biological diversity compared. In *Papers from the parasession on theory and data in linguistics*. Chicago Linguistic Society, ed. Pp. 69-75. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
- Kulvadee Boonpinon. 1997. Institutional arrangements in communal resource management: A case study of a Karen village in a protected area. MSc thesis, Faculty of Graduate Studies, Mahidol University, Bangkok.
- Kunstadter, Peter, Edward Charles Chapman, and Sanga Sabhasri, eds. 1978. *Farmers in the forest*. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii.
- Kymlicka, Will. 1995. *Multicultural citizenship*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lee, Raymond L. M. 2008. In search of second modernity: reinterpreting reflexive modernization in the context of multiple modernities. *Social Science Information* 47(1):55-69.
- Loh, Jonathan, and David Harmon. 2005. A global index of biocultural diversity. *Ecological Indicators* 5(3):231-241.
- Lyotard, Jean-Francois. 1984. *The postmodern condition*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Maffi, Luisa, ed. 2001. *On biocultural diversity*. Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press.
- Maffi, Luisa, and Ellen Woodley 2010. *Biocultural diversity conservation*. London: Earthscan.
- McKinnon, John M., and Bernard Vienne, eds. 1989. *Hill tribes today*. Bangkok: Golden Lotus.
- McKinnon, John M., and Wanat Bhruksasri, eds. 1983. *Highlanders of Thailand*. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press.
- McManis, Charles, ed. 2007. *Biodiversity and the law: Intellectual property, biotechnology and traditional knowledge*. London: Earthscan.
- McNeely, Jeffrey A., and David Pitt, eds. 1985. *Culture and conservation*. London: Croom Helm.
- Mehta, Pratap Bhanu. 2000. Cosmopolitanism and the circle of reason. *Political Theory* 28(5):619-639.
- Minde, Henry, Svein Jentoft, Harald Gaski, and Georges Midré, eds. 2008. *Indigenous peoples: Self-determination - Knowledge - Indigeneity*. Delft: Eburon.
- Mischung, Roland. 1984. *Religion und Wirklichkeitsvorstellungen in einem Karen-Dorf Nord-west Thailands*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner.
- Münch, Richard. 1986. *Die Kultur der Moderne*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
- Niezen, Roland. 2003. *The origins of indigenism*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Oldfield, Margery L., and Janis B. Alcorn, eds. 1991. *Biodiversity: Culture, conservation, and ecodevelopment*. Boulder: Westview Press.
- Oldham, Paul, and Miriam Anne Frank. 2008. 'We the peoples...': The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. *Anthropology Today* 24(2):5-9.
- Ostrom, Elinor, ed. 1990. *Governing the commons*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Oviedo, Gonzalo T., Luisa Maffi, and Peter Bille Larsen. 2000. *Indigenous and traditional peo-*

- ples of the world and ecoregion conservation*. Gland: WWF; Terralingua.
- Pasuk Phongpaichit, and Chris Baker. 1997. *Thailand: Economy and politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Peet, Richard, and Michael John Watts, eds. 1996. *Liberation ecologies*. London: Routledge.
- Perapong Manakit. 1992. The changing role of the Thai military from orthodox function to national development. PhD dissertation, Fakultät für Soziologie, Bielefeld.
- Perelman, Michael. 2003. *The perverse economy: The impact of markets on people and the environment*. New York: Palgrave.
- Peterson, M. J. 2010. How the indigenous got seats at the UN table. *Review of International Organizations* 5(2):197-225.
- Pinkaew Laungaramsri. 2000. The ambiguity of 'watershed': The politics of people and conservation in Northern Thailand. *Sojourn* 15(1):52-75.
- . 2003. Ethnicity and the politics of ethnic classification in Thailand. In *Ethnicity in Asia*. C. Mackerras, ed. Pp. 157-173. London: RoutledgeCurzon.
- Pogge, Thomas W. 1992. Cosmopolitanism and sovereignty. *Ethics* 103(1):48-75.
- Posey, Darrell Addison, and UNEP, eds. 1999. *Cultural and spiritual values of biodiversity*. London: Intermediate Technology Publications.
- Renard, Ronald Duane. 1979. Kariang: History of Karen-T'ai relations from the beginnings to 1923. PhD dissertation, University of Hawaii, Honolulu.
- . 1980. The role of the Karens in Thai society during the Early Bangkok Period, 1782-1873. *Contributions to Asian Studies* 15:16-28.
- . 1987. The delineation of the Kayah states frontiers with Thailand: 1809-1894. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 18(1):81-92.
- RFD (Royal Forest Department). 1993. *Thai forestry sector master plan*. Bangkok: UNDP.
- Richards, John F. 2003. *The unending frontier*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Rigg, Jonathan. 1993. Forests and farmers, land and livelihoods, changing resource realities in Thailand. *Global Ecology and Biogeography Letters* 3(4-6):277-289.
- Said, Edward W. 1993. *Culture and imperialism*. London: Chatto & Windus.
- Sato, Jin. 2003. Public land for the People: the institutional basis of community forestry in Thailand. *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 34(2):329-346.
- Schmidt-Vogt, Dietrich. 1997. *Swidden farming and fallow vegetation in Northern Thailand*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.
- Schmidt, Volker H. 2006. Multiple modernities or varieties of modernity? *Current Sociology* 54(1):77-97.
- Seub Nakhasathien, and Belinda Stewart-Cox. 1990. *Nomination of the Thung Yai - Huai Kha Khaeng Wildlife Sanctuary to be a U.N.E.S.C.O. World Heritage Site*. Bangkok: RFD.
- Shils, Edward Albert. 1981. *Tradition*. London: Faber & Faber.

- Shiva, Vandana, ed. 1997. *Biopiracy*. Boston: South End Press.
- Sompop Manarungsan. 1989. *Economic development of Thailand 1850-1950*. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University.
- Steinlin, Hansjörg, and Jürgen Pretzsch. 1984. Der tropische Feuchtwald in der internationalen Forstpolitik. *Holz-Zentralblatt* 138.
- Steinmetz, Robert. 1999. The ecological science of the Karen in Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary, Western Thailand. In *From principles to practice: Indigenous peoples and protected areas in South and Southeast Asia*. M. Colchester and C. Erni, eds. Pp. 84-107. Copenhagen: IWGIA.
- Steinmetz, Robert, and Robert Mather. 1996. Impact of Karen villages on the fauna of Thung Yai Naresuan Wildlife Sanctuary. *Natural History Bulletin of the Siam Society* 44:23-40.
- Stepp, John R., Felice S. Wyndham, and Rebecca K. Zarger, eds. 2002. *Ethnobiology and biocultural diversity*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- Stern, Theodore. 1968. Ariya and the golden Book: a millenarian buddhist sect among the Karen. *Journal of Asian Studies* 27(2):297-328.
- . 1990. Eternal divinities in a changing world: the local lords of the Karen. In *Culture and the anthropological tradition*. R. H. Winthrop, ed.. Pp. 205-232. Lanham: University Press of America.
- Stevens, Stan, ed. 1997. *Conservation through cultural survival*. Washington: Island Press.
- Stone, Roger D., and Claudia D'Andrea. 2001. *Tropical forests and the human spirit*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Stott, Philip A. 1991. Mu'ang and Pa. In *Thai construction of knowledge*, Manas Chitakasem and A. Turton, eds. Pp. 142-154. London: School of Oriental and African Studies.
- Taylor, Charles, and Amy Gutmann, eds. 1992. *Multiculturalism and 'the politics of recognition'*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Therborn, Göran. 2003. Entangled modernities. *European Journal of Social Theory* 6(3):293-305.
- Thongchai Winichakul. 1994. *Siam mapped*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
- . 2000. The quest for 'Siwilai': a geographical discourse of civilizational thinking in the late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Siam. *Journal of Asian Studies* 59(3):528-549.
- Tiryakian, Edward A. 2001. Introduction: the civilization of modernity and the modernity of civilizations. *International Sociology* 16(3):277-292.
- Turton, Andrew, ed. 2000. *Civility and savagery*. Richmond: Curzon.
- UN. 2007. *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*. New York: UN.
- UNCED. 1992. *Convention on Biological Diversity*. Rio de Janeiro: UNCED
- UNESCO. 2003. *Cultural Landscapes: The challenges of conservation*. Paris: UNESCO.
- Vanderveest, Peter. 1996a. Mapping nature: territorialization of forest rights in Thailand. *Society & Natural Resources* 9(2):159-175.

- . 1996b. Property rights in protected areas: obstacles to community involvement as a solution in Thailand. *Environmental Conservation* 23(3):259-268.
- . 2003. Racialization and citizenship in Thai forest policies. *Society & Natural Resources* 16(1):19-37.
- Vermeulen, Sonja, and Douglas Sheil. 2007. Partnerships for tropical conservation. *Oryx* 41(4):434-440.
- von Droste, Bernd, Harald Plachter, and Mechtild Rössler, eds. 1995. *Cultural landscapes of universal value*. Jena: Gustav Fischer; UNESCO.
- Wagner, Peter. 2001. *Theorizing modernity*. London: Sage.
- Walker, Andrew. 2001. The 'Karen consensus': ethnic politics and resource-use legitimacy in northern Thailand. *Asian Ethnicity* 2(2):145-162.
- . 2003. Agricultural transformation and the politics of hydrology in Northern Thailand. *Development and Change* 34(5):941-964.
- Walker, Andrew, and Nicholas Farrelly. 2008. Northern Thailand's specter of eviction. *Critical Asian Studies* 40(3):373-397.
- Walzer, Michael. 1990. The communitarian critique of liberalism. *Political Theory* 18(1):6-23.
- Waters, Malcolm, ed. 1999. *Modernity: Critical concepts*. London: Routledge.
- Weatherby, Matthew, and Somying Soonthornwong. 2007. The Thailand Community Forest Bill. *RECOFTC Community Forestry E-News*, December 2007.
- Wells, Michael, and Katrina Brandon. 1992. *People and parks*. Washington: World Bank.
- Wesseling, Hendrik L. 1997. *Imperialism and colonialism*. Westport: Greenwood.
- West, Paige, and James G. Carrier. 2004. Ecotourism and authenticity. *Current Anthropology* 45(4):483-498.
- Western, David, and R. Michael Wright, eds. 1994. *Natural connections: Perspectives in community-based conservation*. Washington: Island Press.
- Whaley, Lindsay J. 2003. The future of native languages. *Futures* 35(9):961-973.
- Williams, Nancy M., and Graham Baines, eds. 1988. *Traditional ecological knowledge: Wisdom for sustainable development*. Canberra: Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies.
- Wolf, Eric Robert. 1982. *Europe and the people without history*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- World Bank. 2001. *Culture and sustainable development*. Washington: The World Bank [cited April 2003. Available from <http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/>].
- . 2004. UN indigenous forum: paper trail. *World Bank Press Review*, May 11.
- Yos Santasombat. 1992. Community-based natural resource management in Thailand. *Asian Review* 6:78-124.
- . 2004. Karen cultural capital and the political economy of symbolic power. *Asian Ethnicity* 5(1):105-120.